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Introduction 
  This paper empirically analyzes the links among official or governmental corruption, economic 
growth, and income distribution.  I use a cross section of countries, both developed and 
underdeveloped.  I find that corruption is an important determinant of both per-capita real growth and 
of the distribution of income.  Corruption is positively and significantly correlated with growth, implying 
that corruption has efficiency-enhancing qualities.  Corruption is positively and significantly correlated 
with inequality, implying that increased income inequality is associated with greater corruption.  The 
most robust specification, which associates three jointly dependent equations using a two-stage least 
squares estimation technique, reinforces the proposition that corruption enhances efficiency, justifies 
inequality’s role in determining growth rates, and lends support to the theory of international 
convergence of growth rates. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 deals with the theoretical relationship among 
corruption, economic growth and inequality.  Section 2 discussed the data used throughout the paper. 
Section 3 empirically examines the relationship between corruption and growth.  Within a “Barro type” 
growth model, I find that corruption has relatively little bearing on economic growth.  These results differ 
from those of Mauro (1995), who found corruption to be negatively and significantly correlated with 
growth.  In an alternative specification for growth, I find that corruption is significantly and positively 
correlated with growth, implying that corruption can be efficiency enhancing.  Section 4 considers 
corruption as the endogenous variable.  I find that the most significant determinant of corruption is 
bureaucratic red tape, followed by initial GDP and relative size of the government sector.   
  Section 5 considers endogenous corruption in the growth model.  Again, corruption is positively 
correlated with higher growth rates.  Section 6 analyzes the relationship between corruption and income   3
distribution.  First, I test the Kuznets Hypothesis, which is that income inequality is a consequent stage in 
economic development.  Corruption is both included and excluded as an institutional factor in 
determining inequality.  My results lend minimal support to the Kuznets Hypothesis that inequality is a 
result of economic growth.  Second, I investigate an alternative specification for the determinants of 
inequality.  I find that corruption’s significance as a  determinant of income distribution is dependent 
upon the inequality specification employed.  Third, I control for the endogeneity of corruption as a factor 
in determining income distribution.  Corruption exhibits a negative and significant relationship with 
income distribution.  I also specify a system of three equations, where income distribution, corruption, 
and economic growth are jointly dependent.  In this more robust specification, corruption has a 
significant positive effect on the growth rate as well as a strong negative effect on the income 
distribution. 
 
Section 1 - Overview of the Theoretical Model 
  There are three questions that this paper addresses empirically. First, what is corruption’s effect, 
if any, on economic growth?  Second, what are the factors that determine corruption?  Third, what is 
the relationship among corruption, economic growth, and income distribution? 
  The positive aspects of corruption on economic development were considered as early as Leff 
(1964).  Corruption can theoretically aid economic development in two ways.  Corruption can provide 
an incentive for the public agent to work harder.  If this is the case, it exists irrespective of the 
institutional makeup of a country.  Secondly, it can act as “speed money.”  Therefore, through 
corruption, the provision of public goods and services can be made more efficient.  This type of 
corruption would only be present in those countries that are known for their bureaucratic red tape.     4
Schleifer and Vishny (1993), among others, have argued that corruption hinders development.  
Their model considers the negative effects of a government that exploits it’s monopoly power over 
public goods and services.  In Barreto (1998), I presented an endogenous growth model that allows for 
corruption, as defined by Schleifer and Vishny, and bureaucratic  red tape to co-exist.  The model 
shows that corruption and red tape are theoretically consistent with positive real economic growth.  It 
goes on to show that given certain degrees of public bureaucracy, corruption can even have positive 
growth effects.  Although the corrupt equilibrium that alleviates red tape is a second best to no 
corruption and no red tape, it is preferable to no corruption and red tape.  Irrespective of whether or 
not red tape is present though, I also found that corruption does affect income inequality. 
To test the above hypothetical institutional arrangements, consider two economies.  In one, 
public goods are provided by a selfless government and, in the other, public goods are provided by a 
self-seeking government.  One naturally expects the economy with the selfless government to out-
perform the one with the self-seeking government.  The following growth model can therefore be tested: 
  Growth = a1 + [Corruption,...] ￿ ai + e              1.1 
             (+/-) 
 
where corruption is an institutional factor that affects growth. The expected signs are below each 
variable in brackets. 
  But corruption is not necessarily independent, as the above model assumes; it is the endogenous 
result of a country’s institutional development.  What institutional factors would one expect to be 
associated with corruption?  If corruption aids development, then one would expect a strong positive 
relationship with bureaucratic red tape.  If corruption hurts development due to governments flexing their 
monopoly power, one would expect less provision of public goods at a higher price. Education might 
play a role in determining corruption.  One might expect a more educated population to be less tolerant   5
of corruption.  Lastly, corruption might be just a stage in the development process through which every 
country must pass.  Thus, initial GDP might play a role.  One might expect the following theoretical 
corruption model: 
  Corruption = d1 + Red Tape ￿ d2 + Govt./GDP ￿ d3 + Education ￿ d 4 + Initial GDP ￿ d 5 + e   1.2 
          (+)       (-)                  (-)              (-)   
   
  I have already pointed out that if corruption is significant, it is likely to affect a country’s income 
distribution.  Therefore, the following model can also tested: 
  Inequality = b1 + [Corruption,...] ￿ bj + h              1.3 
          (+) 
 where the other factors that influence inequality are to be determined. 
  The above three models suggest a system of simultaneous equations where corruption is 
endogenous and affects both growth and income distribution.  Also, if inequality affects growth as some 
have suggested (Clarke, 1995; Field, 1989), the following model can be tested: 
  Growth = a1 + [Corruption, Inequality, ...] ￿ ai + e1            1.4 
            (+/-)          (+/-) 
  Inequality = b1 + [Corruption,...] ￿ bj + e 2              1.5 
                        (+) 
  Corruption = d1 + Red Tape ￿ d2 + Govt./GDP ￿ d3 + Education ￿ d 4 + Initial GDP ￿ d 5 + e2   1.6 
            (+)       (-)                 (-)                 (-) 
 
where, apriori, the signs of corruption and inequality in the growth equation are indeterminate. 
 
Section 2 - Description of the Data 
  The data used in this study come from various sources although I attempt to maintain data 
consistency.  The study employs two data sets.  The larger one, Data Set #1, contains the same 58 
countries that were employed by Mauro (1995). Included are both developed and  
Table 1   6
Country Country Country
1 Algeria 21 Hong Kong 41 Pakistan
2 Argentina 22 India 42 Panama
3 Australia 23 Indonesia 43 Peru
4 Austria 24 Iran, Islamic Rep. 44 Philippines
5 Bangladesh 25 Ireland 45 Portugal
6 Belgium 26 Israel 46 Saudi Arabia
7 Brazil 27 Italy 47 Singapore
8 Cameroon 28 Jamaica 48 South Africa
9 Canada 29 Japan 49 Sri Lanka
10 Chile 30 Kenya 50 Thailand
11 Colombia 31 Korea, Rep. 51 Trinidad and Tobago
12 Denmark 32 Liberia 52 Turkey
13 Dominican Rep. 33 Malaysia 53 United Kingdom
14 Ecuador 34 Mexico 54 United States
15 Egypt, Arab Rep. 35 Morocco 55 Uruguay
16 Finland 36 Netherlands 56 Venezuela
17 France 37 New Zealand 57 Zaire
18 Germany 38 Nicaragua 58 Zimbabwe
19 Ghana 39 Nigeria
20 Greece 40 Norway
Data Set #1
 
underdeveloped countries.  This data set is limited by the lack of availability of corruption and red tape 
statistics, which are taken from Business International (henceforth referred to as BI) (see Business 
International Corp., 1984).  Data Set #2 contains 56 countries, where Saudi Arabia and Zaire are 
excluded due to the lack of income distribution data for these two countries. 
 
2.1 The Business International indices of corruption, red tape and political stability 
  The indices proxying corruption, red tape and political stability were originally drawn from BI 
now incorporated in The Economist Intelligence Unit, by Mauro (1995).  He describes the BI data 
as follows. 
“...BI is a private firm that sells these indices typically to banks, multinational companies, and 
other international investors.  BI published indices on 56 “country risk” factors for 68 countries, 
for the period 1980-1983, and on 30 country risk factors for 57 countries, for the period 1971-
1979.  “Factor Assessment Reports” are filled in BI’s network of correspondents and analysts 
based on the countries covered.  Assessment reports undergo further checks at BI’s regional 
level, as well as BI’s corporate headquarters, in order to insure accuracy and consistency of the 
results.  The indices reflect the analysts’   7
perspectives on risk and efficiency factors, and may be taken to represent investors’ 
assessments of conditions in the country in question.” 
 
  This paper employs three indices for corruption, red tape, and political stability.  Corruption and 
red tape are actual BI indices, while political stability, taken from Mauro (1995), is the simple average 
of the first six relevant BI indices.  BI’s definitions of all of these indices are as follows.1 
1.  Political Change - Institutional - “Possibility that the institutional framework will be 
changed within the forecast period by elections or other means.” 
2.  Political Stability - Social - “Conduct of political activity, both organized and individual, 
and the degree to which the orderly political process tends to disintegrate or become violent.” 
3.  Probability of Opposition Group Takeover - “Likelihood that the opposition will come to 
power during the forecast period.” 
4.  Stability of Labor - “Degree to which labor represents possible disruption of manufacturing 
and other business activity.” 
5.  Relation with Neighboring Countries - “This includes political, economic and commercial 
relations with neighbors that may affect companies doing business in the country.” 
6.  Terrorism - “The degree to which individuals and businesses are subject to acts of 
terrorism.” 
7.  Bureaucracy and Red tape - “The regulatory environment foreign firms must face when 
seeking approvals and permits.  The degree to which it represents an obstacle to business.” 
8.  Corruption - “The degree to which business transactions involve corruption or questionable 
payments.” 
 
  The value if the indices range from 1 to 10.  A higher value is always “good.”  For example the 
corruption index for the United States, Mexico and United Kingdom are 10, 3.25 and 9.25, 
respectively.  The political stability index for those same three countries is 9.33, 6.88 and 8.33, 
respectively. 
  Red tape and corruption, the two indices of most relevance here, exhibit a strong positive 
correlation of .84.  This is not surprising, since by assumption corruption is more likely in the presence 
of red tape.  A common form of corruption is the type of bribe, or “speed money”, that is meant to cut 
through the public sector red tape that would otherwise hamper business.  In such a situation, red tape is 
                                                                   
1 The indices are described in detail in Business International Corporation [1984].   8
a form of externality associated with the public sector, which the private sector is willing to pay to have 
reduced. Thus, the less red tape in an economy, the less available and less lucrative is corruption.   
  In Barreto (1998), I characterize an equilibrium in a neoclassical endogenous growth 
framework, in which red tape and consequent corruption redistribute income with little or no effect on 
growth.  It has also been argued that public agents might create red tape in order to capitalize on rents 
from later corruption (Krueger, 1993; de Soto, 1989).  A proposition of this paper is that corruption is 
an endogenous result of red tape and other institutional factors.  Another proposition is that corruption is 
a significant factor in determining growth, particularly when its endogenous nature is specified. 
 
2.2 Indices of Income Distribution 
  An important objective here is to assess whether corruption affects the distribution of income. I 
use GINI coefficients to measure inequality.  The GINI coefficient is defined as the ratio of the area in 
between the line of perfect equality and the Lorenz curve, relative to the total area under the diagonal.   
  The problem lies with finding a consistent data series of income distributions for all countries.  
The methodology for calculating incomes varies widely from source to source. The World Bank 
compiles such data, but often draws information from various other sources, none of which can be easily 
verified for consistency.  But even supposing that available data are consistent, they are still infrequently 
compiled.  There is not available, to my knowledge, a single series of cross-country income distribution 
data for any given year or range of years since 1970.2 
                                                                   
2 There are several cross sectional inequality data sets for 1960 as well as 1970, for example Taylor and Hudson (1972) 
and Taylor and Jodice (1983).   9
  I use income distribution data for 1985 where it is available and as close to 1985 where it is 
not.3  When more than one data point for any given country for a given year exists, I simply calculate the 
average value.  Previous studies (Clarke, 1995; Alesina and Rodrick, 1991; Persson and Tebellini, 
1991) assume that income distribution changes very slowly.  They therefore include inequality data from 
any year that is available.  Although this may be a plausible assumption for developed economies, the 
evidence for less developed countries suggests that income distribution is relatively volatile.  For 
example, inequality in India improved 23% from 1975 to 1990, while that of Paraguay worsened by 
50% from 1973 to 1981, and then improved by 30% from 1981 to 1992.4  Thus, inequality within a 
country is a reflection of the various institutional changes that have occurred in that country.  This result 
may not be surprising considering the volatile nature of business and politics in many LDC’s. 
 
2.3 Per Capita Real GDP and Per Capita Real GDP Growth Rate 
  All income and investment data was drawn from Summers and Heston (1991, 1988) but were 
actually obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research Penn World Table World Wide 
Web site.   These variables are: 
GROWTH - This is the average yearly growth rate of per capita real GDP from 1971 to 1985 
in purchasing power parity terms. 
 
GDP and GDP2 - These are the average per capita real GDP and average per capita real 
GDP squared for the years 1971 to 1985 in purchasing power parity terms. 
 
GDP70 - This is the per capita real GDP for 1970 in purchasing power parity terms. 
 
INV_GDP -  The 1971 to 1985 average of the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP. 
                                                                   
3 Appendix 1 details the year and source of each data point. 
4 The GINI measures for India are .38 in 1975 and .29 in 1990, according to The World Bank.  The GINI measures for 
Paraguay are .50 for 1973, .55 for 1977, .75 for 1981 and .52 for 1992, according to various sources compiled by Sauma, 
et al., (1993).   10
 




2.4 Other Variables 
  All remaining data series were drawn from The World Bank, World Tables, various years.  
These include: 
SED75 - This is the percent of the population that has secondary school education in 1975.5 
 
POPGR - This is the average yearly growth rate of the population from 1971 to 1985. 
 
DEF_GDP - This is 1971 to 1985 average of the ratio of the public sector deficit to GDP. 
 
A summary of all of the variables along with their means and standard deviations is presented in Table 2.  
Table 3 is the correlation matrix. 
 
Section 3 - The Effects of Corruption on Growth 
  Recent empirical work by Mauro (1995) has suggested that corruption hinders economic 
growth.  I test that proposition using Data Set #1.  The hypothesis test may be described as follows. 
GROWTH = a1 + CORRUPT ￿ a2 + [growth factors,...] ￿ ai + e 
H0: ￿a2 ￿>0 
HA: ￿a2 ￿=0 
Table 4 reports the results of regressing growth on corruption alone as well as including various 
alternative control variables. The model I employ is commonly referred to as a “Barro type” after  
Table 2 
Summary of Variables 
                                                                   
5 Education statistics for the United States are drawn from the U.S. Bureau of the Census and those from South Africa 




SED75 0.491 0.260 The World Bank, World Tables , (1993)
GDP70 4.354 3.354 Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6
CORRUPT 6.658 2.583 Business International Corporation, (1984)
REDTAPE 5.971 2.335 Business International Corporation, (1984)
POLSTAB 7.559 1.405 Mauro, (1995)
GROWTH 0.020 0.020 Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6
G_GDP 0.171 0.063 Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6
POPGR 0.019 0.011 The World Bank, World Tables , (1993)
GDP 5.313 4.024 Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6
GDP2 44.137 53.404 Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6
LATAM 0.224 0.421 Latin America Dummy Variable
OECD 0.310 0.467 OECD Dummy Variable




SED75 GDP70 CORRUPT REDTAPE POLSTAB GROWTH
SED75 1.000
GDP70 0.787 1.000
CORRUPT 0.703 0.703 1.000
REDTAPE 0.633 0.631 0.841 1.000
POLSTAB 0.488 0.489 0.551 0.586 1.000
GROWTH 0.121 -0.033 0.134 0.255 0.531 1.000
G_GDP -0.308 -0.313 -0.274 -0.259 -0.269 -0.229
POPGR -0.842 -0.622 -0.638 -0.533 -0.484 -0.188
GDP 0.788 0.983 0.709 0.660 0.559 0.100
GDP2 0.718 0.962 0.659 0.636 0.540 0.067
LATAM -0.106 -0.107 -0.039 -0.115 -0.130 -0.298
OECD 0.826 0.788 0.646 0.548 0.497 0.104
INV_GDP 0.655 0.519 0.593 0.558 0.537 0.475  
Table 3 (cont.) 
Correlation Matrix 









GDP -0.347 -0.615 1.000
GDP2 -0.279 -0.560 0.971 1.000
LATAM -0.176 0.090 -0.149 -0.225 1.000
OECD -0.273 -0.782 0.784 0.776 -0.361 1.000
INV_GDP -0.447 -0.544 0.573 0.469 -0.107 0.576 1.000 
Barro (1989), but the choice of control variables follows Mauro (1995).  Note first that the coefficient 
on corruption is not significantly different from zero in any of the specifications.  This result differs from   12
Mauro’s work, where he found corruption to be a statistically significant determinant of the average 
yearly per capita real GDP growth rate.6  The difference in results is due, at least in part, to specification 
error on Mauro’s part.  With cross sectional studies of this type, inclusion of irrelevant variables or 
exclusion of relevant variables can make other variables related to growth switch signs or become 
insignificant. 
  In light of this possibility, I perform a complete extreme-bounds analysis (Leamer, 1983), 
henceforth referred to as EBA, with GROWTH as the dependent variable.  The analysis is meant to test 
the sensitivity of an independent variable to the inclusion or exclusion of other independent variables.  
The same experiment was first done by Levine and Renelt (1992), who find that most of the variables 
traditionally used in Barro type growth models are actually “fragile” with respect to inclusion and 
exclusion errors.  In other words, as the specification of the growth model changes, significant variables 
change sign or become insignificant.  In fact, the only variables that are really “robust”, i.e. remains 
significant and does not switch signs due to inclusion and exclusion of other variables, is investment as a 
share of GDP and the political stability index. 
The basic Barro type growth model is defined as follows.  The four variables are based on 
economic theory and past empirical studies.  The coefficient values and their White corrected standard 
errors in brackets are the results using Data Set #1. 
  GROWTH = .014  + .182 * INV_GDP - .002 * GDP70 - .523 * POPGR - .025 * SED75 
         (.014)   (.043)          (.001)         (.356)      (.021) 
 
                                                                   
6 Mauro uses 1961 to 1985 averages to get his results, but he claims that the results do not change when 1971 to 1985 






[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
C 0.013~ 0.025~ 0.015 -0.035* -0.027* -0.044* -0.036*
(.009) (.019) (.015) (.015) (.015) (.013) (.013)
CORRUPT 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
SED75 0.008 -0.025 0.015~ 0.024~ -0.003 0.009
(.018) (.021) (.011) (.015) (.013) (.015)
GDP70 -0.002* -0.002~ -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.002*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
G_GDP -0.052~ -0.082* -0.015 -0.045*
(.038) (.032) (.033) (.027)
POPGR -0.423 -0.532~
(.385) (.356)
POLSTAB 0.010* 0.009* 0.008* 0.008*
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)






N 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
R Squared 0.018 0.095 0.356 0.439 0.544 0.542 0.625  
White corrected standard errors are in brackets. 
* indicates significance of 5% or less 
~ indicates significance of 10% 
OECD and LATAM are dummy variables for OECD countries and Latin American countries, respectively. 
 
(R2 = .356, number of observations = 58)  Notice that the coefficient on SED75 is the “wrong” sign.  
Thus, even the basic growth model is not free of specification error.   
  Table 5 reports the results of the sensitivity analysis using Data Set #1 with GROWTH as the 
dependent variable.7  As expected, the investment to GDP ratio is the most robust determinant of 
growth.  The other three basic growth variables, GDP70, SED75 and POPGR are fragile in that they 
become insignificant depending upon the specification.  Interestingly, the political stability index, 
POLSTAB, is robust, which highlights its importance as a factor in determining growth. This result is 
intuitively plausible as well as consistent with those of other    14
Table 5 
Sensitivity Analysis of Basic Variables
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
Variable coef. S.E. t R Sq. other variables
INV_GDP base: 0.124 0.034 3.667* 0.225
high: 0.171 0.034 5.061* 0.449
GDP70 CORRUPT POPGR OECD 
LATAM
low: 0.068 0.034 1.982* 0.335 G_GDP POLSTAB
GDP70 base: -0.0002 0.0006 -0.317 0.001
high: -0.003 0.0006 -5.313* 0.533 G_GDP INV_GDP POLSTAB
low: -0.0004 0.0006 -0.608 0.094 LATAM
SED75 base: 0.009 0.008 1.205 0.015
high: -0.034 0.009 -3.662* 0.444 INV_GDP POLSTAB
low: 0.0004 0.014 0.030 0.058 G_GDP CORRUPT
POPGR base: -0.357 0.175 -2.046* 0.037
high: -0.62 0.214 -2.892* 0.162 GDP70 LATAM
low: -0.013 0.32 -0.041 0.438 SED75 G_GDP GDP70 POLSTAB
CORRUPT base: 0.001 0.001 0.866 0.018
high: -0.003 0.001 -3.431* 0.434 INV_GDP POLSTAB
low: 0.00002 0.002 0.011 0.067 G_GDP POPGR
POLSTAB base: 0.008 0.002 4.834* 0.286
high: 0.009 0.002 5.429* 0.456 CORRUPT POPGR OECD LATAM
low: 0.005 0.002 3.231* 0.388 G_GDP INV_GDP LATAM  
Number of Observations = 58 in all of the above cases. 
All standard errors are White corrected for heteroskedasticity 
* denotes White corrected t statistics with significance of 5% and below 
studies (Barreto, 1998; Alesina, Özler, Roubini and Swagel, 1992; Barro, 1991); that is, there is a 
strong positive relationship between political stability and per capita GDP growth.  Corruption is also 
fragile.  Its performance as a regressor in the growth model is comparable to that of the other regressors 
in the basic model. 
  To better understand the interaction of these variables with one another as discerned by the 
extreme bounds analysis, consider graphs [1] through [6].  These graphs show the level of significance 
of each variable as the model specification changes.  Notice the graphs for POSTAB and INV_GDP 
depict the consistently high significance irrespective of the specification.  Also GDP70, although not 
perfect, performs reasonably well.  The four regression in which GDP70 performs badly are the base, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
7 The same sensitivity analysis was also performed on a Data Set #1 but excluding OECD countries.  There was no 
change in the results.   15
i.e. where GDP70 stands alone on GROWTH, and regressions in which GDP70 is accompanied by the 
dummy variables, OECD and LATAM.  In all of the other regressions where GDP70 is accompanied 
















































































































































negative.  In other words, higher initial GDP per capita is associated with lower growth rates.  This is to 
be expected if one believes the convergence hypothesis.8  The graphs for SED75 and POPGR depict 
truly “fragile” variables.  As you can see from the SED75 graph, as more variables are added to the 
regression, the significance of SED75 generally declines.  Although the sign of POPGR is consistently 
negative, i.e. high population growth is consistent with lower per capita GDP growth rates, the nature of 
the EBA test demands one should be very suspect of the robustness of the results.  Finally, consider 
Graph [5] describing CORRUPT.  There is no doubt of its fragility in the growth model.  But note that 
when CORRUPT is significant, it’s sign is negative.  In other words, more corruption is associated with 
lower growth.  But again, little weight should be put on this conclusion. 
  The EBA sensitivity test suggests the most robust results should be obtained from the most 
empirically justifiable starting point.  Henceforth, I assume that growth is robustly determined by 
investment as a share of GDP (i.e. INV_GDP), political stability (i.e. POLSTAB), and initial per capita 
GDP (i.e. GDP70).  The inclusion of other regressors can provide interesting results, but the conclusions 
drawn from such results should be considered subject to specification errors. 
.  Table 6 reports the results of selected specifications. Columns [1], [3], [5] and [7] use the entire 
Data Set #1 and columns [2], [4], [6] and [8] use Data Set #1 excluding OECD countries.  Columns 
[1] and [2] report the results of the growth model that is empirically robust according to the above 
sensitivity analysis. They include only the regressors representing investment, political stability, and initial 
GDP.  Columns [3] and [4] report the results of the same growth model with corruption included.  
Notice that the coefficient on CORRUPT is not significantly different from zero.  Columns [5] and [6] 
suggests that Latin American countries’ growth rates have been 
                                                                   






[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
C -.049* -.050* -.088* -.049* -.042* -.048* -.036* -.040*
(.011) (.024) (.011) (.013) (.011) (.011) (.017) (.023)
INV_GDP .120* .145* .129* .157* .1025* .158* .135* .159*
(.029) (.034) (.031) (.036) (.029) (.033) (.034) (.038)
POLSTAB .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008* .008*
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
CORRUPT -.001 -.001~ -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001~
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
SED75 -.013 -.008
(.014) (.022)
GDP70 -.003* -.004* -.003* -.004* -.003* -.002* -.002* -.003*





N 58 40 58 40 58 40 58 40
R Squared .531 .548 .540 .563 .593 .626 .546 .565  
White corrected standard errors are in brackets. 
* indicates significance of 5% or less 
~ indicates significance of 10% 
LATAM is a dummy variable for Latin American countries 
 
disproportionately below those in the rest of the world.  Columns [7] and [8] report the results of the 
basic Barro type growth model plus the variables, POLSTAB and CORRUPT. 
  An issue that has received considerable attention lately is the effect of income inequality on 
growth.  In light of this, I now include an inequality measure in the model.  In theory, inequality might aid 
growth in that it ”...contains the seeds of eventual increase in everyone’s income.” (Adelmann and 
Robinson, 1989, p. 951)  The basic premise is that the rich save relatively more of their incomes than 
do the poor and their saving eventually translates into economic growth.  Therefore, redistribution of 
income will only reduce capital accumulation and slow growth (Field, 1989).  However, recent work 
has suggested that inequality hinders economics growth (Clarke, 1995; Alesina and Rodrick, 1991; 
Persson and Tabellini, 1991).   19
  Graph [7] shows the sensitivity analysis of inequality on growth.  It is clear from the graph that 
there is evidence for the inclusion of inequality in the growth model.  Table 7 reports the results of 
regressions using the smaller Data Set #2, as necessitated by the limited availability of information on 
GINI coefficients.  Columns [1] and [2] detail the results of the basic growth models with the inequality 
measure included. Columns [3] shows the results of the regression where the corruption index and only 
the robust variables, INV_GDP, POLSTAB and GDP70, are included.  Notice that the coefficient on 
GINI is negative and significantly different from zero in all three cases.  Thus, higher levels of income 
inequality are associated with lower real GDP per capita growth rates.  When only non-OECD 
countries are considered, the results are more robust.  Simply put, this evidence supports the notion that 
greater inequality hurts growth.  Notice that the coefficient on corruption not significantly different from 
zero anywhere.   
  The results reported in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that investment, political stability, initial GDP and 
inequality are all important determinants of growth.  Specifically, more investment and greater political 
stability aid growth while income inequality hurts growth.   The higher is the initial per capita GDP, the lower 
is the likely growth rate.   
  Table 8 reports the effect of a one-standard-deviation change in the right-hand-side variable on 
the GROWTH.  The table is divided into two parts corresponding to Data Set #1 and Data Set #2.  In 
each case, I choose the highest coefficient value among those reported in Tables 6 and 7.  The table 
describes a simple test of economic significance.  Although the coefficient on a variable is statistically 
significant, it does not necessarily imply that changes in the values of that variables corresponds to a 
large change in the value of the dependent variable.  Thus, I classify a right-hand-side variable as 
economically significant when a one-standard-deviation    20





[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
C .043* -.012 -.023~ .058* .0003 -.016
(0.014) (.020) (.015) (.019) (.025) (.016)
INV_GDP .185* .138* .123* .223* .175* .165*
(.042) (.035) (.032) (.042) (.039) (.038)
POLSTAB .008* .008* .007* .008*
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
CORRUPT -.001 -.001 -.001 -.001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
SED75 -.032* -.019~ -.035~ -.018
(.019) (.014) (.025) (.019)
GDP70 -.003* -.003* -.003* -.004* -.004* -.004*
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.002)
POPGR -.673* -.151 -1.008* -.391
(.402) (.455) (.561) (.658)
GINI -.0005* -.0005* -.0004* -.0007* -.0006* -.0006*
(.0003) (.0003) (.0002) (.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
OECD
N 56 56 56 38 38 38
R Squared .383 .556 .546 .455 .595 0.587
-----     Data Set #2     ----- Data Set #2                              
Non-OECD  Only
Corruption, Inequality and Growth
Dependent Variable: GROWTH
 
White corrected standard errors are in parentheses. 
* indicates significance of 5% or less 
~ indicates significance of 10% 
OECD is a dummy variable for OECD countries. 
 





























Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation




GROWTH 58 0.020 0.020
SED75 58 0.491 0.260 -17% Table 6, Col. 7
GDP70 58 4.354 3.354 -34% Table 6, Col. 7
CORRUPT 58 6.658 2.583 -13% Table 6, Col. 7
POLSTAB 58 7.559 1.405 56% Table 6, Col. 7
POPGR 58 0.019 0.011 -14% Table 6, Col. 7
LATAM 58 0.224 0.421 -21% Table 6, Col. 5
INV_GDP 58 0.197 0.076 51% Table 6, Col. 7
OECD 58 0.310 0.467 -40% Table 7, Col. 5








GROWTH 40 0.019 0.024
SED75 40 0.348 0.164 -7% Table 6, Col. 8
GDP70 40 2.597 1.969 -31% Table 6, Col. 8
CORRUPT 40 5.547 2.248 -12% Table 6, Col. 8
POLSTAB 40 7.096 1.424 60% Table 6, Col. 8
POPGR 40 0.024 0.008 -9% Table 6, Col. 8
LATAM 40 0.325 0.474 -42% Table 6, Col. 6
INV_GDP 40 0.167 0.070 58% Table 6, Col. 8






  Two interesting aspects of Table 8 are worth noting.  First, corruption plays a far more 
important role when only non-OECD countries are considered.  Second, when the political stability 
index and the inequality measure are both included in the regression, as in Data Set #2, then the political 
stability index is half as economically significant.  This is probably because low levels of political stability 
are more likely to associated with higher degrees of income inequality. 
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Section 4 - Endogenous Corruption 
    A proposition tested in this paper is that corruption is the endogenous result of bureaucratic red tape 
as well as other institutional variables.  Furthermore, the neglect of the endogeneity of corruption may lead 
to erroneous conclusions about corruption’s effect on economic growth. 
  In Barreto (1998), I present a neoclassical growth model where corruption is the endogenous 
result of competition between the public sector and the private sector.  In this framework, endogenous 
corruption is a function of the public sector’s share in the production process.  The corruption 
equilibrium, in the eyes of the private sector, is second-best to a “clean” economy, where the public 
sector produces and distributes its services as if it were a perfectly competitive industry.  When red tape 
is introduced to the model, the corruption equilibrium can be shown to be preferable to both agents in 
terms of welfare as well as growth, thereby implying efficiency-enhancing corruption.  In other words, if 
corruption serves to alleviate excessive bureaucratic red tape, it can be a “good thing.” 
  The association between red tape and corruption is intuitively plausible and theoretically 
justifiable.  But what are the other factors that influence corruption?  Section 1 of this paper discussed 
the factors that one might expect to influence corruption.  The model is specified as follows. 
  Corruption = d1 + Red Tape ￿ d2 + Govt./GDP ￿ d3 + Education ￿ d 4 + Initial GDP￿ d5 + e   4.1 
          (+)     (-)                 (-)           (-) 
 
Similar to the last section, I performed an extreme-bounds analysis (Leamer, 1983) on corruption as the 
dependent variable.  The underlying model assumption is that REDTAPE belongs in the corruption 
equation.  According to Leamer (1983), REDTAPE would therefore be an “I-variable.”  The variables 
in question that are to be tested are “M-variables.” 
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Table 9 
Sensitivity Analysis of M Variable affecting Corruption
Dependent Variable: CORRUPT
Variable coef. S.E. t R sq. Other Variables
G_GDP base: -2.434 3.160 -.770 .710 REDTAPE
high: -2.434 3.160 -.770 .710 REDTAPE
low: .004 3.120 .001 .760 REDTAPE G_GDP SED75 LATAM
SED75 base: 2.834 .797 3.554* .755 REDTAPE
high: 2.756 .757 3.642* .757 REDTAPE SED75 POLSTAB
low: .100 1.389 .072 .779
REDTAPE SED75 GINI POLSTAB 
GDP70 OECD LATAM
GDP70 base: .221 .055 4.057* .756 REDTAPE
high: .215 .052 4.119* .757 REDTAPE GDP70 POLSTAB
low: .074 .067 1.102 .782
REDTAPE GDP70 POLSTAB SED75 
OECD LATAM  
Standard errors are all White corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
* significant at 5% or below 
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis are presented in Table 9.  Notice that all three of the variables in 
question, G_GDP, SED75 and GDP70 are fragile, but that SED75 and GDP70 perform significantly 
better that G_GDP.  Based on this empirical fact, the “best” model for corruption is therefore:9 
  Corruption = d1 + Red Tape ￿ d2 + Education ￿ d3 + Initial GDP ￿ d5 + e       4.2 
          (+)    (-)              (-)   
  Table 10 presents the results of corruption as the endogenous variable. Columns [1] to [4] 
consider the entire Data Set #1, and columns [4] to [7] consider only non-OECD countries. As 
expected, bureaucratic red tape is the most significant determinant of corruption, followed by GDP70 
and SED75.  Notice that the OECD dummy is positively correlated with CORRUPT, which suggests 
that corruption is disproportionately lower than in OECD countries, a result that reinforces the 
government expenditure-corruption relationship.   
 
                                                                   
9 The signs below the equation represent the direction of the correlation with corruption, i.e. a higher relative Initial 
GDP should be associated with less corruption. But recall that the nature of CORRUPT variable is that a high value 
represents less corruption.  In Table 9, as in all the tables, the coeficient signs represent the direction of the 
correlation with the variable CORRUPT.   25
Table 10 
----------- All Countries -----------
Independent 
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
C 1.175~ 1.129* 1.299* .977* .749 .807 .867
(.823) (.521) (.581) (.505) (.994) (.704) (.704)
REDTAPE .687* .687* .708* .693* .789* .788* .794*
(.085) (.085) (.082) (.086) (.096) (.094) (.094)
G_GDP -.219 .264
(2.628) (2.732)
SED75 1.686~ 1.694* .473 1.717* .558 .554 -.033
(1.043) (1.027) (1.344) (1.037) (1.458) (1.448) (1.503)
GDP70 .136* .137* .074 .139* .199* .198* .151~
(.067) (.067) (1.12) (.068) (.118) (.117) (.111)
OECD 1.266*
(.743)
LATAM .817* .438 .716
(.570) (.474) (.606)
N 58 58 58 58 40 40 40





OECD and LATAM are dummy variables for OECD countries and Latin American countries, respectively. 
Standard errors in brackets are all White corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
* significant at 5% or below 
~ significant at 10% 
 
  An interesting influence on corruption is initial GDP.   The coefficient on GDP70 is almost 
always positive and significantly different from zero.  This implies a negative correlation with corruption.  
Therefore counties with a higher initial GDP, i.e. the more developed ones, tend to have lower 
corruption.   Those same countries also tend to have lower per capita growth rates.  Furthermore recall 
that the evidence that CORRUPT is negatively correlated with growth. (i.e. refer back to tables 6 and 
7)  In sum, higher initial GDP levels are associated with lower corruption levels and lower corruption 
levels are associated with lower growth rates.  Taken together, these results loosely conform to the 
theory of international convergence of economic growth rates.   
 
Section 5 - Endogenous Corruption and Growth   26
  This section considers endogenous corruption within the growth model.  A simple two-stage-
least-squares estimation technique is used.  The pivotal issue is the way in which growth is specified.  I 
test three specifications.  They are ones described by Table 6, columns [5],  Table 6, column [7], and 
Table 7, column [5].  The specification for corruption employed in all of the following estimations is the 
same as in Table 10, column [4].  The three two-stage-least-squares estimates are described as follows: 
System 1 
CORRUPT = a1 + REDTAPE a2 + G_GDP a2 + GDP70 a3 + OECD a4  + LATAM a5 + e1.1  5.1 
GROWTH = b1 + INV_GDP b2+ POLSTAB b3 + CORRUPT b4+ LATAM b5 +  e1.2      5.2 
 
System 2 
CORRUPT = a1 + REDTAPE a2 + G_GDP a2 + GDP70 a3 + OECD a4  + LATAM a5 + e2.1  5.3 
GROWTH=b1 +INV_GDP b2+POLSTAB b3 +CORRUPT b4+SED75 b5+GDP70 b6+POPGR b7 +e2.  5.4 
 
System 3 
CORRUPT = a1 + REDTAPE a2 + G_GDP a2 + GDP70 a3 + OECD a4  + LATAM a5 + e3.1  5.5 
GROWTH = b1 + INV_GDP b2+ POLSTAB b3 + CORRUPT b4+ GINI b5 + OECD b6 +  e 3.2    5.6  
 
  The results of the three experiments are reported in Table 11.  CORRHAT is the appropriate 
fitted value from the reduced form equation for CORRUPT.  Columns [1] and [2] in Table 11 are the 
same as columns [4] and [8] from Table 10.  Columns [4] and [6] are the same as columns [3] and [5], 
respectively, except that only non-OECD countries are considered. Notice that the coefficient on the 
corruption variable is significant only in columns [3] and [7].  In columns [5] and [6], which represent 
the basic growth model with corruption and political stability added to it, the coefficient on corruption is 
insignificant.  Thus, when corruption’s endogeneity is explicitly addressed within the basic model, 
corruption has little bearing on growth.  In column [7], which is the robust growth model with corruption 
and inequality added to it, all the variables are significant.  The results of growth on endogenous 
corruption suggest that, if corruption plays a part in determining growth rates, it has a positive influence.  




Stage 1-Dep.Var.: CORRUPT Stage 2 - Dependent Variable: GROWTH






[3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
C 1.104* .533 C -.031* -.047* -.017 -.007 .037~
(.538) (.624) (.011) (.011) (.020) (.029) (.028)
REDTAPE .667* .782* INV_GDP .001* .001* .002* .002* .0009*
(.092) (.114) (.0004) (.0004) (.0005) (.0006) (.0004)
G_GDP 3.107* 2.111 POLSTAB .008* .008* .007* .006* .008*
(1.540) (2.702) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.003)
SED75 CORRHAT -.004* -.001 -.003 -.002 -.004*
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.003) (.002)
GDP70 .109* .222~ SED75 -.016 -.024
(.076) (1.527) (.020) (.027)
DEF_GDP GDP70 -.002 -.004*
(.002) (.002)
OECD 1.000* POPGR -.565~ -.805
(.418) (.407) (.677)






N 53 36 N 53 36 53 36 25
R Squared .789 .645 R Squared .492 .586 .554 .582 .489  
OECD and LATAM are dummy variables for OECD countries and Latin American countries, respectively. 
Standard errors in brackets are all White corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
* significant at 5% or below 
~ significant at 10% 
  The most interesting results pertaining to growth are those of column [7].  Only Mauro (1995), 
has explicitly included corruption in a Barro type growth model.  His results are opposed to the current 
findings.  On the other hand, there are several empirical studies that associate inequality to growth with 
results conforming with these.  Furthermore, since the traditional factors that affect growth are included 
in the specification of corruption and all the signs conform to intuition, it seems that the above system of 
dependent equations is an appealing specification for corruption and its consequent effect on growth. 
 
Section 6 - Endogenous Corruption and Inequality   28
  The weakness of the results in Table 11, column [7] is the assumption that the inequality 
measure is exogenous.  Theoretical work dating back to Kuznets (1955), followed by extensive 
empirical studies (Ram, 1995, 1989; Anand and Kanbur, 1992), strongly support a relationship 
between development and inequality.  Of course, it is also intuitively reasonable to believe that a 
country’s level of inequality is a function of its development, as well as various institutional factors. 
  Kuznets (1955) proposed the hypothesis that during the course of a country’s economic 
growth, inequality increases, reaches a peak, and then declines. Therefore, the theory suggests that 
inequality is the consequence of a country’s early development.  The functional form that implies such a 
relationship is described as follows: 
  Inequality = a + b · GDP + g · GDP
2              6.1 
The inverted U shape of the development inequality relationship implies that the expected signs of b and 
g are positive and negative, respectively. This next section tests for the presence of a Kuznets process 
and then explores some alternative specifications. 
  A few comments regarding the functional form are in order.  First, if GDP is zero, then one 
would expect that inequality should also be zero.  Therefore, the only permissible value for a is also 
zero.  Ram (1995) pointed out that this constraint is important and should not be overlooked.  Second, 
other empirical papers extend the inverted-U functional form to include other institutional regressors 
(Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990).  This is not clearly justifiable if the added institutional regressors 
are themselves proxies for the level of development in a country.  In such a case, the regressors in 
question should be treated as alternatives to the income terms, not additions to them.  In a cross-  29
sectional framework, however this observation does not apply to variables that represent structural 
differences among observations within the sample.10 
  Table 12 reports the results of the tests of Kuznets’ Hypothesis.  I find little support for the 
Kuznets process in its traditional form but some support for it given the a=0 constraint.  Irrespective of 
which specification is considered, it is evident that the inequality development relationship is 
misspecified.  In Table 12, column [1], the significance of the coefficient on the constant is extremely 
high and in column [3], the model fit is poor.  It is likely that both columns [1] and [3] are misspecified. 
  In light of the above results as well as the conclusions from previous work where I found that 
corruption should have a significant effect on income inequality (see Barreto, 1996), consider the 
following income-inequality model:  
  Inequality = b1 + [Corruption, DPopulation, Education,...] ￿ b2i+ e        6.2 
          (+)              (+)        (+) 
It is natural that the population growth affects inequality.  The populations with the highest birthrates are 
often the poorest segments of an economy.  Thus, the population growth will disproportionately affect 
the income of one group more than another.  It seems plausible that as the general population becomes 
more educated, the degree of income inequality would decrease. As education improves, so does 
number of individuals who distinguish themselves.  These individuals eventually pose competition to the 
established wealth.  As the competition increases, inequality should therefore decrease. 
                                                                   
10 The exclusion of the constant term as suggested by Ram (1995) also necessarily prohibits the addition of structural 
regressors, otherwise inequality(0)=b·GDP(0)+g·GDP(0)









GDP -.014 -0.008 .159*
(.017) (-0.016) (.025)




N 25 25 25
R Squared .471 .539 .067  
Standard errors in brackets are all White corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
* significant at 5% or below 
 
  Table 13 reports the results of the sensitivity analysis.  Notice that POPGR is robust to the 
inclusion of other variables.  SED75 is robust at the 10% level.  CORRUPT loses its significance 
depending on the other regressors included and is therefore fragile. 
  Table 14 reports the results of the three regressions.  Although the coefficients on POPGR and 
SED75 in column [1] and [2] are significant, the coefficient on CORRUPT is not.  But in column [3] 
and [4], when education is omitted from the inequality model, corruption is significant at the 10% level.  
The results of the test for the determinants of income distribution suggest the following.  As is 
theoretically expected, higher populations growth rates also imply greater inequality, and higher average 
educational attainment is associated with less inequality.  In the absence of education, corruption implies 






coef. S.E. t R sq. Other Variables
CORRUPT high: .506 .034 15.097* .520
base: .506 .034 15.097* .520
low: .002 .006 .405 .841 GDP70 POPGR G_GDP 
SED75 LATAM
POPGR high: 6.725 1.173 5.731* .761 GDP70 DEF_GDP
base: 5.951 .011 25.613* .670
low: 2.762 1.452 1.905* .790 SED75 CORRUPT LATAM
SED75 high: -.350 .091 -3.768* .765 GDP70 CORRUPT G_GDP
base: -.236 .037 -6.451* .695







[1] [2] [3] [4]
C 0.423* .408* .360* .357*
-0.057 (.050) (.048) (.043)
CORRUPT .003 .001 -.007~ -.006~
(.006) (.006) (.005) (.004)
POPGR 2.820* 2.762* 4.560* 4.094*





N 25 25 25 25
R sq. .744 .790 .701 .763  
OECD is a dummy variables for OECD countries. 
Standard errors in brackets are all White corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
* significant at 5% or below 
~ significant at 10% 
 
  Notice that the significance of the constant term is still very high in all of the cases.  But, 
comparing Table 12 to Table 14, the results from the latter estimation provide a somewhat better fit.  It 
would seem that more work needs to be done with respect to test for the determinants of inequality. 
 
Section 7 - Endogenous Corruption, Inequality, and Growth   32
  The results thus far show that corruption has a questionable effect on income distribution and 
that corruption also seems to aid growth.  In this section I construct a system of three jointly dependent 
equations that I estimate using a two-stage-least-squares estimation technique.  I test three different 
models.  All employ the specification for growth from Table 7, column [5] and the specification for 
corruption from Table 10, column [2].  Model 1 assumes a Kuznets process for inequality, and Model 
2 and Model 3 assumes the ad hoc definitions of inequality that was developed in Section 6. 
2SLS Model 1 
  Growth = a1 + a2i ￿ [Investment/GDP, PoliticalStability, Corruption, Inequality, OECD] + e1  7.1 
  Inequality = b1 + b2j ￿ [Corruption, GDP, GDP
2] + e2         7.2 
  Corruption = d1 + d2k ￿ [RedTape, Govt/GDP, InitialGDP] + e3       7.3 
 
2SLS Model2 
  Growth = a1 + a2i ￿ [Investment/GDP, PoliticalStability, Corruption, Inequality, OECD] + e1  7.4 
  Inequality = b1 + b2j ￿ [Corruption, PopulationGrowth, Education, LATAM] + e2    7.5 
  Corruption = d1 + d2k ￿ [RedTape, Govt/GDP, InitialGDP] + e3       7.6 
 
2SLS Model3 
  Growth = a1 + a2i ￿ [Investment/GDP, PoliticalStability, Corruption, Inequality, OECD] + e1  7.7 
  Inequality = b1 + b2j ￿ [Corruption, PopulationGrowth, LATAM] + e2        7.8 
  Corruption = d1 + d2k ￿ [RedTape, Govt/GDP, InitialGDP] + e3       7.9 
 
  Table 15 reports the results of the above three models.  CORRHAT is the fitted value for 
corruption and GINIHAT is the fitted value for inequality.  In summary, the system of equations 
suggests that corruption aids growth and inequality hinders it.  Higher relative investment and political 
stability are associated with higher growth rates and OECD countries generally have lower growth rates.  
The effect of corruption on income inequality depends on how inequality is specified.  In column [2], the 
coefficient on corruption is significant and negative, implying that more corruption is associated with less 
income equality.  In column [4], the coefficient on   33
Table 15 
Two Stage Least Squares
Jointly Dependent Variables: GROWTH, GINI & CORRUPT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pre-determined 
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
CORRUPT GROWTH GINI GROWTH GINI GROWTH GINI
C 1.048 .051~ .524* .061* .408* .071* .367*
(.867) (.032) (.039) (.035) (.050) (.036) (.052)
CORRHAT -.004* -.019* -.004* .002 -.004* -.007~
(.001) (.008) (.002) (.012) (.002) (.005)










INV_GDP .0008* .0008* .0007*
(.0004) (.0003) (.0003)
POLSTAB .008* .008* .009*
(.003) (.003) (.003)










N 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
R Squared .851 .456 .537 .520 .790 .557 .761  
OECD and LATAM are dummy variables for OECD countries and Latin American countries, respectively. 
Standard errors in brackets are all White corrected for heteroskedasticity. 
* significant at 5% or below 
~ significant at 10% 
 
corruption is insignificant and in column [6] it is significant at the 10% level.  Also from columns [4] and 
[6], higher population growth rates are associated with greater inequality and Latin American countries 
have a higher propensity for income inequality.  Interestingly, the coefficient on education loses 
significance when the endogeneity of corruption is explicitly considered.   34
 
Conclusion 
  The evidence from this study demonstrates the statistical importance of corruption in the 
development of a robust model that explains the growth rate of per capita real GDP.  It also 
demonstrates the statistical importance of corruption in determining income inequality.  Depending upon 
how inequality is specified, corruption aids growth at the expense of more unequal distribution of 
incomes.  The results differ significantly from previous work on corruption’s effect on growth.   35
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